]> Siemens

Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1 Munich 80333 Germany hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com https://www.siemens.com

Siemens Mobility

Ackerstrasse 22 Braunschweig 38126 Germany david.goltzsche@siemens.com https://www.mobility.siemens.com

sec LAMPS Working Group Industrial Automation ERJU extended key usage extension PKI RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines KeyPurposeIds for general-purpose and trust anchor configuration files, for software and firmware update packages, and for safety-critical communication to be included in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key certificates used by industrial automation and the ERJU System Pillar.

Introduction Automation hardware and software products will strategically be more safe and secure by fulfilling mandatory, generic system requirements related to cyber security driven by federal offices like the European Union Cyber Resilience Act governed by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Automation products connected to the internet would bear the CE marking to indicate they comply. Such regulation was announced in the 2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy, and complements other legislation in this area, specifically the NIS2 Framework, Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. 2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy suggests to implement and extend international standards such as the Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components and the Industrial communication networks - Network and system security - Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels. Automation hardware and software products of diverse vendors that are connected on automation networks and the internet build a typical automation solution. Harmonized attributes would allow transparency of security properties and interoperability for vendors in context of secure software and firmware updates, general-purpose configuration, trust anchor configuration, and secure safety communication. A concrete example for Automation is a Rail Automation system. The Europe's Rail Joint Undertaking System Pillar will deliver a unified operational concept and a functional, safe, and secure system architecture alongside with system requirements for Rail Automation. The deliverables include due consideration of cyber security aspects based on the IEC 62443 series of standards, focused on the European railway network to which Directive 2016/797 - Interoperability of the rail system within the EU applies. The ERJU System Pillar Cyber Security Working Group makes use of PKIs to generate X.509 PKI certificates. The certificates are used for the following purposes, among others:

• Validating signatures of general-purpose software configuration files.
• Validating signatures of trust anchor configuration files.
• Validating signatures of software and firmware update packages.
• Authenticating communication endpoints authorized for safety-critical communication.

specifies several key usage extensions, defined via KeyPurposeIds, for X.509 certificates. Key usage extensions added to a certificate are meant to express intent as to the purpose of the named usage, for humans and for complying libraries. In addition, the IANA registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" contains additional KeyPurposeIds. The use of the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId, as defined in , is generally considered a poor practice. This is especially true for certificates, whether they are multi-purpose or single-purpose, within the context of ERJU System Pillar. If the purpose of the issued certificates is not restricted, i.e., the type of operations for which a public key contained in the certificate can be used are not specified, those certificates could be used for another purpose than intended, increasing the risk of cross-protocol attacks. Failure to ensure proper segregation of duties means that an application or system that generates the public/private keys and applies for a certificate to the operator certification authority could obtain a certificate that can be misused for tasks that this application or system is not entitled to perform. For example, management of trust anchor is a particularly critical task. A device could potentially accept a trust anchor configuration file signed by a service that uses a certificate with no EKU or with the KeyPurposeId id-kp-codeSigning () or id-kp-documentSigning . A device should only accept trust anchor configuration files if the file is signed with a certificate that has been explicitly issued for this purpose. The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth () can be used to identify that the certificate is for a TLS WWW server, and the KeyPurposeId id-kp-clientAuth () can be used to identify that the certificate is for a TLS WWW client. However, there are currently no KeyPurposeIds for usage with X.509 certificates for safety-critical communication. This document addresses the above problems by defining keyPurposeIds for the EKU extension of X.509 public key certificates. These certificates are either used for signing files (general-purpose configuration and trust anchor configuration files, software and firmware update packages) or are used for safety-critical communication. Vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds used within a PKI governed by the vendor or a group of vendors typically do not pose interoperability concerns, as non-critical extensions can be safely ignored if unrecognized. However, using or misusing KeyPurposeIds outside of their intended vendor-controlled environment can lead to interoperability issues. Therefore, it is advisable not to rely on vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds. Instead, the specification defines standard KeyPurposeIds to ensure interoperability across various vendors and industries. Although the specification focuses on use in industrial automation, the definitions are intentionally broad to allow the use of the KeyPurposeIds defined in this document in other deployments as well. Whether and how any of the KeyPurpose OIDs defined in this document must be described in more detail in the technical standards and certificate policies relevant to the industrial sector.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Extended Key Purpose for Automation This specification defines the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-configSigning, id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning, id-kp-updatePackageSigning, and id-kp-safetyCommunication and uses these, respectively, for: signing general-purpose or trust anchor configuration files, signing software or firmware update packages, or authenticating communication peers for safety-critical communication. As described in , "[i]f the [extended key usage] extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used for one of the purposes indicated" and "[i]f multiple [key] purposes are indicated the application need not recognize all purposes indicated, as long as the intended purpose is present". None of the keyPurposeId's specified in this document are intrinsically mutually exclusive. Instead, the acceptable combinations of those KeyPurposeId's with others specified in this document and with other KeyPurposeId's specified elsewhere are left to the technical standards of the respective area of application and the certificate policy of the respective PKI. For example, a technical standard may specify: 'Different keys and certificate MUST be used for safety communication and for trust anchor updates, and a relying party MUST ignore the KeyPurposeId id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning if id-kp-safetyCommunication is one of the specified key purposes in a certificate.', and the certificate policy may specify: 'The id-kp-safetyCommunication KeyPuposeId SHOULD NOT be included in an issued certificate together with the KeyPurposeId id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning.' Technical standards and certificate policies of other area of application may specify other rules. Further consideration on prohibiting combinations of KeyPurposeIds is described in the Security Considerations section of this document. Systems or applications that verify the signature of a general-purpose or trust anchor configuration file, the signature of a software or firmware update package, or the authentication of a communication peer for safety-critical communication SHOULD require that corresponding KeyPurposeIds be specified by the EKU extension. If the certificate requester knows the certificate users are mandated to use these KeyPurposeIds, it MUST enforce their inclusion. Additionally, such a certificate requester MUST ensure that the KeyUsage extension be set to digitalSignature or nonRepudiation (also designated as contentCommitment) for signature verification and if needed to keyEncipherment for secret key encryption and/or keyAgreement for key agreement.

Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates specifies the EKU X.509 certificate extension for use on end entity certificates. The extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key is valid. The EKU extension can be used in conjunction with the Key Usage (KU) extension, which indicates the set of basic cryptographic operations for which the certified key may be used. The EKU extension syntax is repeated here for convenience: As described in , the EKU extension may, at the option of the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. The inclusion of KeyPurposeIds id-kp-configSigning, id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning, id-kp-updatePackageSigning, and id-kp-safetyCommunication in a certificate indicates that the public key encoded in the certificate has been certified for the following usages:

• id-kp-configSigning

• A public key contained in a certificate containing the KeyPurposeId id-kp-configSigning may be used for verifying signatures of general-purpose configuration files of various formats (for example XML, YAML, or JSON). Configuration files are used to configure hardware or software.

• id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning

• A public key contained in a certificate containing the KeyPurposeId id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning may be used for verifying signatures of trust anchor configuration files of various formats (for example XML, YAML, or JSON). Trust anchor configuration files are used to add or remove trust anchors to the trust store of a device.

• id-kp-updatePackageSigning

• A public key contained in a certificate containing the KeyPurposeId id-kp-updatePackageSigning may be used for verifying signatures of secure software or firmware update packages. Update packages are used to install software (including bootloader, firmware, safety-related applications, and others) on systems.

• id-kp-safetyCommunication

• A public key contained in a certificate containing the KeyPurposeId id-kp-safetyCommunication may be used to authenticate a communication peer for safety-critical communication based on TLS or other protocols.

Implications for a Certification Authority The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority MUST ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension as well as the KU extension are inserted in each certificate that is issued. The inclusion of the id-kp-configSigning, id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning, id-kp-updatePackageSigning, and id-kp-safetyCommunication KeyPurposeIds does not preclude the inclusion of other KeyPurposeIds.

Security Considerations The Security Considerations of are applicable to this document. These extended key usage key purposes do not introduce new security risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing the means to identify if the certificate is generated to verify the signature of a general-purpose or trust anchor configuration file, the signature of a software or firmware update package, or the authentication of a communication peer for safety-critical communication. To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying party or the relying party software may additionally prohibit use of specific combinations of KeyPurposeIds. The procedure for allowing or disallowing combinations of KeyPurposeIds using excluded KeyPurposeId and permitted KeyPurposeId, as carried out by a relying party, is defined in . The technical standards and certificate policies of the area of application should specify concrete requirements for excluded or permitted EKUs or their combinations. An example of excluded KeyPurposeIds can be the presence of the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId. Examples of allowed KeyPurposeIds combinations can be the presence of id-kp-safetyCommunication together with id-kp-clinetAuth or id-kp-serverAuth.

Privacy Considerations In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2, certificates are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS 1.3, the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the EKU extension can help an observer determine the purpose of the certificate. In addition, if the certificate is issued by a public certification authority, the inclusion of an EKU extension can help an attacker to monitor the Certificate Transparency logs to identify the purpose of the certificate.

IANA Considerations IANA is requested to register the following ASN.1 module OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in .

Decimal	Description	References
TBD1	id-mod-automation-eku	This-RFC

IANA is also requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These OIDs are defined in .

Decimal	Description	References
TBD2	id-kp-configSigning	This-RFC
TBD3	id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning	This-RFC
TBD4	id-kp-updatePackageSigning	This-RFC
TBD5	id-kp-safetyCommunication	This-RFC

Acknowledgments We would like to thank the authors of and for their excellent template. We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable feedback.

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. ITU-T ITU-T Informative References This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK] When the Public-Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Working Group was chartered, an object identifier arc was allocated by IANA for use by that working group. This document describes the object identifiers that were assigned in that arc, returns control of that arc to IANA, and establishes IANA allocation policies for any future assignments within that arc. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs. This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts. Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document. RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines a general-purpose Document-Signing KeyPurposeId for inclusion in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 public key certificates. Document-Signing applications may require that the EKU extension be present and that a Document-Signing KeyPurposeId be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to that Document-Signing application. RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines encrypting JSON objects in HTTP messages, using JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), and signing the OAuth 2.0 access tokens KeyPurposeIds for inclusion in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key certificates used by Network Functions (NFs) for the 5G System. European Parliament, Council of the European Union Europe's Rail Joint Undertaking European Commission European Commission European Commission IEC IEC

ASN.1 Module The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications and . Automation-EKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-eu-automation-eku (TBD1) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- OID Arc id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } -- Extended Key Usage Values id-kp-configSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD2 } id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD3 } id-kp-updatePackageSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD4 } id-kp-safetyCommunication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD5 } END ]]>

History of Changes [RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix in the release version of the document.] Changes from 02 -> 03:

• Rename id-kp-trustanchorSigning to id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning
• Rename id-kp-updateSigning to id-kp-updatePackageSigning
• Fixed some nits

Changes from 01 -> 02:

• Updates Sections 3 and 6 addressing last call comments (see "WG Last Call for draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages-01")

Changes from 01 -> 02:

• Implemented the changes requested during WGLC

Changes from 00 -> 01:

• Fixed some minor nids and wording issues

draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages version 00:

• Updated document and filename after WG adoption

Changes from 00 -> 01:

• Updated last paragraph of Section 1 addressing WG adoption comments by Rich and Russ
• Updated name and OID of ASN.1 module

draft-brockhaus-lamps-automation-keyusages version 00:

• Broadened the scope to general automation use case and use ERJU as an example.
• Fixed some nits reported.

draft-brockhaus-lamps-eu-rail-keyusages version 00:

• Initial version of the document following best practices from RFC 9336 and RFC 9509

Contributors Siemens AG Digital Industries Factory Automation

Breslauer Str. 5 Fuerth 90766 Germany szofia.fazekas-zisch@siemens.com https://www.siemens.com

Alstom

baptiste.fouques@alstomgroup.com

CAF Signalling

daniel.gutierrez@cafsignalling.com

Hitachi Rail

martin.weller@urbanandmainlines.com

SNCF

nicolas.poyet@sncf.fr